Introduction
This paper draws from international entrepreneurship (IE) and institutional theories in order to explore rapid internationalization of family-owned ventures from emerging economies. The paper is in response to a number of gaps and challenges identified in the extant IE literature.
For example, since the inception of IE (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994) , the research in the field has focused mainly on internationalization of new high-technology ventures from developed economies (Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2008) 1 and paid virtually no attention to the internationalization of new (both high-and low-technology) ventures from emerging economies. Further, the research on internationalization of family-owned ventures in IE is in its early stage (Casillas, Acedo and Moreno, 2007; Kontinen and Ojala, 2010) , with effectively no research on family-owned ventures from emerging economies 2 . To the above, being positioned at the intersection of international business and entrepreneurship streams of research (McDougall and Oviatt, 2000) , it seems the IE field resists blending these two research streams (Keupp and Gassmann, 2009; Turcan, 2006) , and it needs to borrow more actively from other disciplines in order for the IE theory to evolve (Turcan, Mäkelä, Sørensen and Rönkkö, 2010) .
To address the above-identified gaps and challenges, this paper explores how new, family-owned ventures from emerging economies internationalize. In this process, the paper draws from institutional theory with a focus on venture and industry emergence (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) , and from institutional voids theory (Khanna, Paleru and Sinha, 2005) . In line with a theory-building research design, this paper adopts a singlecase study strategy and relies on intensity sampling, the logic and power of which lie in purposefully selecting information-rich cases that manifest the phenomenon intensely, but not extremely (Miles and Huberman, 1994) .
1 For review of IE research, please refer, e.g., to Jones, Coviello and Tang (2011) , Kraus (2011) , Coombs, Sadrieh and Annavarjula (2009) , Keupp and Gassmann (2009) , Rialp, Rialp and Knight (2005) , and Coviello and Jones (2004) . 2 For review of internationalization of family-owned ventures in IE research, please refer to Casillas, Acedo and Moreno (2007) and Kontinen and Ojala (2010) .
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A new, rapidly-internationalized, family-owned venture -Dried-Fruit -located in Moldova was selected for this study. Data collection took place in two phases: in 2008 and 2011. The following section discusses the extant research on internationalization of new ventures from emerging economies and positions the current research within institutional theory as one of the legs of the international business strategy tripod (Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2008) . The research context is presented next, followed by the methodology section. The research findings are presented immediately after, followed by theoretical reflections.
Theoretical background

International new ventures from emerging economies
In this research we side with Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds (2008: 60) who maintain that "if research on entrepreneurship and internationalization is to keep up with practice, it seems imperative that at least some of our attention be devoted to these cutting-edge cross-border entrepreneurial activities moving from [emerging economies to developed economies]".
Although scarce, the research on internationalization of new ventures from emerging economies is gradually taking form (see e.g., Dib, da Rocha and da Silva, 2010; Lopez, Kundu and Ciravegna, 2009; Naude and Rossouw, 2010; Thai and Chong, 2008; Turcan and Fraser, 2012; Zhang, Tansuhaj and McCullough, 2009; Zhou, Barnes and Lu, 2010; Zou and Ghauri, 2010) . The findings thus far point, for example, to learning-capability and networking-capability as capability-upgrading constructs that differentiate international new ventures (INVs) in emerging economies from traditional internationalizing ventures.
Looking at the currently available theory-building research, the findings suggest that
INVs from emerging economies internationalize gradually (see Turcan and Fraser (2012) for an exception), do not follow the internationalization patterns suggested by the studies of INVs (from developed economies), and are born regional rather than global (Lopez, Kundu and Ciravegna, 2009; Thai and Chong, 2008; Zou and Ghauri, 2010) . As to the internationalization of family-owned ventures from the IE perspective, the current knowledge of the internationalization process of family-owned ventures is also rather limited (Casillas, Acedo and Moreno, 2007; Kontinen and Ojala, 2010) , yielding more or less similar results.
For example, in their review of empirical research on internationalization of family-owned ventures, Kontinen and Ojala (2010) found that family-owned ventures tend to 3 internationalize gradually into countries that are close geographically and culturally, encountering in the process various strategic and managerial challenges (Gallo and Sveen, 1991 ).
Despite the above attempts, earlier criticism of the research on the internationalization of new ventures from emerging economies (Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2008) , of the research on entrepreneurship in emerging economies (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Obloj, 2008) , as well as of the research on family-owned ventures (Casillas, Acedo and Moreno, 2007; Kontinen and Ojala, 2010 (Kontinen and Ojala, 2010) . For example, out of 24 empirical papers reviewed by Kontinen and Ojala (2010) , 4 are from China and the remainder is from developed countries.
As to the conceptualization of INVs from emerging economies in general, it has been suggested to position the research on INVs from emerging economies within the strategy tripod that consists of an industry-based view leg, a resource-based view leg, and an institution-based view leg (Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2008) .
The variables that define the first leg are industry evolution and concentration, knowledgeintensity of the industry, local industry internationalization, global integration of industry, industry venture capital, and regime of appropriability in industry (Fernhaber, McDougall and Oviatt, 2007) . The variables that define the second leg relate to network and knowledge (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005a) , as well as to organizational learning and entrepreneurial orientation (Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2008) . The variables of the final leg are the three fundamental pillars of institutions, namely regulative, normative, and cognitive (Scott, 2001 ).
Given that INVs "...have no prior corporate history in the industry, and hence no prior market presence" (Fan and Phan, 2007: 1114) , one may expect the behavior of INVs in the early years of their existence to be shaped substantially by the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965 ) and the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) . From the institution-based view, 4 legitimacy is viewed as playing a key role in overcoming the above liabilities and concerns in
INVs (Turcan, 2011) .
3
An institutional theory perspective on INVs from emerging economies
Institutional theory emphasizes the effects of various structures surrounding organizations that shape organizational and social behavior (Scott, 2001) . From the institutional theory perspective, there are three dimensions that contribute to the theoretical understanding of the internationalization of new ventures from emerging economies. One dimension relates to the emergence of an economy. Khanna and Paleru (1997) suggest that the most important criterion defining an emerging economy is how well an economy helps buyers and sellers to come together, arguing that an emerging economy falls short to varying degrees in providing the institutions necessary to support basic business operations.
Institutional theory conceptualizes institutions as the rules of the game in a society (North 1990; Scott 2001) , and institutional transitions as fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players (Peng 2003: 275) . Khanna, Paleru and Sinha (2005) further define the institutional context of an emerging economy as its political and social system, openness, product markets, labor markets, and capital markets and suggest that weak institutions give birth to institutional voids that hamper the implementation of companies" strategies.
The other dimension relates to the process of emergence of a (new) market or a sector of the economy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) . Uncertain decision-making settings characterize an emergent market, where decisions are made under conditions of technology and market uncertainty, as well as goal ambiguity. In such kinds of uncertain decision-making settings, the possible outcomes of decisions to pursue a new venture and the probability of those outcomes are unknown (Alvarez and Barney, 2005) . Another set of constraints facing entrepreneurs in an emerging market relates to the lack of cognitive and socio-political legitimacy (Ranger-Moore, Banaszak-Holl and Hannan, 1991) of that market. As argued by Glynn and Marquis (2004) , new ventures" conformity to norms and practices will legitimate them only to the extent that those norms and practices are themselves legitimate, credible, and valued.
The next dimension pertains to the process of emergence of the new venture, and the associated liabilities of newness and foreignness. It is a process that can be understood and predicted by viewing it as a quest for legitimacy (Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007) , whereby legitimacy is defined as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 574) . During the process of emergence or quest for legitimacy, a new venture attempts to reach a legitimacy threshold "…below which the new venture struggles for existence and probably will perish and above which the new venture can achieve further gains in legitimacy and resources" (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002: 427) . In this quest, a new venture seeks different legitimation strategies (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) in order to enhance its survival and facilitate the transition to other forms of organizing activities (Delmar and Shane, 2004) .
In terms of new venture legitimation strategies, several theoretical perspectives can be identified. Suchman (1995) proposes three strategies for acquiring legitimacy that are available to new ventures, namely conformance, selection, and manipulation. Conformance strategy involves seeking legitimacy by achieving conformity within the demands and expectations of the existing social structure in which the venture is currently positioned, i.e., it involves "following the rules." Selection strategy allows the new venture to select a favorable geographic location where there are organizations that conform to similar rules, norms, values and models and may provide a new venture with legitimacy, e.g., software ventures locating their operations in Silicon Valley, California, or Silicon Glen, Scotland. Manipulation strategy involves making changes in the environment to achieve consistency between the venture and its environment. A fourth legitimation strategy is put forward by Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002: 425) , this being creation strategy, which "...involves developing something that did not already exist in the environment", such as new operating practices, norms, values, beliefs, expectations, models, patterns of behaviour, and networks. This strategy is especially evident during the introductory stage of new industries and is considered to be the most strategic of all legitimation strategies (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) .
At another level, legitimation strategies of new ventures could be grouped into the following four symbolic legitimation strategies: (i) credibility, defined as personal capability and personal commitment to the venture; (ii) professional organizing, defined as professional structures and processes; (iii) organizational achievement, defined as partially-working products and technologies, venture age and number of employees; and (iv) quality of 6 stakeholder relationships, defined as prestigious stakeholders, and personal attention (Zott and Huy, 2007) . Recently, in a study of new ventures that were trying to legitimize in their efforts to internationalize and survive before and after the dot.com bubble, Turcan (2011) proposes six legitimation strategies. These are: (i) technology, aimed to validate a technology or knowhow; (ii) market, aimed to better understand the market; (iii) operating, aimed to have an optimal organizational gestalt; (iv) locational, aimed to overcome the disadvantages of foreignness; (v) alliance, aimed to mitigate the risk of newness and smallness; and (vi) anchoring, aimed to intentionally misrepresent the facts. In a longitudinal ethnographic case study of internationalization of a software venture from an emerging economy, Turcan and Fraser (2012) found for example that in order to acquire cognitive legitimacy and sociopolitical legitimacy and successfully internationalize, an international new venture needs to design a robust business model targeting both internal and external stakeholders, engage in persuasive argumentation invoking familiar cues and scripts, promote and defend incentives and operating mechanisms in political negotiations, and overcome the country-of-origin effect by pursuing a technology legitimation strategy.
Research setting
Moldova is a country landlocked between Romania and Ukraine; it became independent in 1991 as a result of the collapse of the USSR. Moldova stretches just under 450 km from north to south, and less than 250 km from east to west, having just over 3.5 million citizens and being positioned in a lower middle income category (www.doingbusiness.org). According to the Global Competitiveness index, Moldova is a factor-driven economy that maintains its competiveness primarily via its public and private institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, and its workforce (www.weforum.org). Historically, the agricultural sector in Moldova has been considered as one of the main pillars of the national economy, accounting for over 16% of the country"s GDP, and contributing approximately 50% to Moldova"s total exports. The production of dried fruit per year is somewhere between 2000 and 3500 metric tonnes, subject to the quality and growing conditions of the raw material. A few large and medium sized companies dominate the dried fruit market in Moldova (Table 1) , accounting for about 67% of the total turnover (CNFA, 2008) . There are also a large number of small exporters that are focused on the Russian market and/or the markets of other CIS countries, and that could be described as the ones that do not have the necessary capabilities to meet the safety and quality requirements of the EU market, as well as those unable to ensure proper communications with EU customers (CNFA, 2008) .
Insert Table 1 about here 6 The Index of Economic Freedom measures and ranks 161 countries across 10 specific freedoms: business, trade, fiscal, monetary, investment, financial, property rights, labour freedoms, freedoms from Government and corruption. Each one of the 10 freedoms is graded using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represent the maximum freedom. A score of 100 signifies an economic environment or set of policies that is most conducive to economic freedom. 7 Economies are ranked from 1 to 183 by the ease of Doing Business Index that includes 10 topics: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. A high ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm.
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The EU market absorbs approximately 80% the Moldovan sector"s output of dried fruit, with the remainder going to CIS markets, primarily Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Being a net exporter of dried fruit, despite the fact that the sector is operating under its capacity (CNFA, 2008) , Moldova is among the leading suppliers of selected organic dried fruit (from developing countries) to the EU with a total share of 3% (CBI, 2005) .
Method
In line with a theory-building research design (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991) , as well as driven by the nature of the research question, that being how new family-owned ventures from emerging economies internationalize, a single-case study strategy was adopted for the purpose of theory building. The case company was purposefully selected following the intensity sampling strategy, the logic and power of which lie in selecting information-rich cases that manifest the phenomenon intensely, but not extremely (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . Three selection criteria were identified in order to select the case company. One, the case company shall resemble an INV defined as a new venture that aims to derive profits from international activities right from their inception or immediately thereafter (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005b) .
Two, the case company shall meet the criteria of a family-owned venture, defined as a venture "…where a single family owns the majority of stock and has total control" (Gallo and Sveen, 1991: 181) . And three, the case company has to be located in an emerging economy.
Following the above sampling strategy and criteria, a family owned venture, referred to here as Dried-Fruit, was selected for the study. The interviews were recorded with the permission of interviewees, and transcribed verbatim.
Data extracted were sent back to the interviewees, thus contributing to the enhancement of the research validity.
Unobtrusive data (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest, 2000) were collected at length to further contribute to the triangulation of the data that were emerging from the interviews.
The unobtrusive data consisted of (i) running records, such as legislative initiatives and bills, and mass media, and (ii) episodic and private records, such as sales records, and industrial and institutional records. A database for the case was created to organize and document all the data collected, thus contributing to the reliability of the study.
Following the theory-building process, within-case analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was conducted, whereby the case company was explored and described in detail. According to Dubin (1969) , the very essence of description is to name the properties of things, and the more adequate the description, the greater the likelihood that the concepts derived from the description will be useful in subsequent theory building. The case company is explored and described in detail employing an even-list matrix as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) for within-case analysis. The interview transcripts and secondary data pertinent to each case were coded in an iterative manner, working back and forth between theory, emerging patterns and data. Within-case analysis was the basis for developing early constructs surrounding the internationalization of the new venture from an emerging economy.
Findings
Emergence of an economy and a new sector of the economy
As the data suggest, Dried-Fruit started its operations in an emerging sector of an economy located in an emerging country. As concluded by CNFA (2008: 29) , "…the challenge that lies ahead for the first one(s) to launch organic production [in Moldova] becomes daunting".
Essentially, Dried-Fruit, together with the other two competitors, was a pioneer in this emerging sector of the economy (Figure 1 ). In such circumstances, learning-from-others is not an option since apparently there are no role models in the sector, and the environment does not understand or acknowledge the existence of the new, emerging venture (Stinchcombe, 1995) . As to the lack of understanding of the emerging sector, hence the lack of cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) , when asked about the legislative improvement the CEO/owner would like to see, she replied:
mean [the members of the parliament] shall do nothing as I am afraid they can make the situation worse. It is not ideal now, but I am afraid it can get worse after they try to improve it".
The data further point to other institutional voids, the remedy of which are vital for the survival of an emerging venture in an emerging economy. For example, one of the biggest growth challenges was scarcity and quality of labor (labor market institutional void); this challenge is amplified as Dried-Fruit is located away from the capital and district centers. It has to be also mentioned that up to one million of citizens left Moldova in search for work abroad since its independence in 1991 (www.state.gov). As to the quality of labor, the owner of Dried-Fruit pointed to the fact that vocational education was almost non-existent, and the current university graduates are of low quality. This negative trend was also observed in other sectors of the economy (e.g., ICT and software) by the members of the Parliament who went on respective company internships.
The other growth challenge pertains to the access to funding (capital market institutional void). As mentioned earlier, the local financial market is not sophisticated, with no venture capital industry, being dominated by local banks, with foreign banks first being granted access to the market in 2008. The key issue is about the cost and time of the funding. The interest rates were and are still very high, e.g., 14% to 16% for USD or Euros, and over 20% for Moldova Leu with a settlement period for a loan being somewhere between 1 and 3 years.
Another growth challenge relates to the exchange rate (openness institutional void Data point to another institutional void that is coined here as local government. Given the existing proclivity to decentralize decision-making processes and give more power to, hence empower, local governments, the effect of local governments on the process of the emergence of a new venture and a new sector should not be underestimated. For example, Dried-Fruit had to build and bear the costs (~ €65,000) associated with the construction of a gas pipeline and the road to the company premises. When Dried-Fruit approached the mayor"s office to ask for a refund, it was refused on the grounds that "these costs were not budgeted by the mayor's office". As the owner of Dried-Fruit explained: "they live in their world, we, in
Another challenge is suggested by the data, namely disloyal competition (openness institutional void) in the market that comes from small dried fruit producers. These producers" products are of low quality and are unofficial (bypassing the tax authorities), making them "low cost/low price" producers/exporters. To deal with these kinds of issues, Dried-Fruit joined the Association of Canned Producers through which it made its voice heard to the Government and at the same time it received support in finding potential investors.
Internationalization of Dried-Fruit
The owner of Dried-Fruit saw the opportunity for the dried fruit market sometime before launching the company when she was the executive director of one of the largest fruit and vegetable processing enterprises in Moldova. Unable to pursue this opportunity in that capacity due to red tape and lack of support for dramatic changes, the owner left that enterprise and decided to pursue the identified opportunity on her own by starting her own venture. Besides her drive and motivation for success, the owner brought to the new venture her knowledge, experience and understanding of the market and the business. Three colleagues followed the owner to the new venture, being responsible for the marketing and sales, engineering, and accounting areas.
Not selling internationally was not an option for the owner; as she put it: "how many dried fruits Moldova can consume?", implying that the local market was too small. The issue was which way to go: east or west, to the Russian and CIS markets or to the EU market.
Going east did not require undertaking substantial legitimation efforts as a great number of Moldovan companies were selling dried-fruits to Russia and other CIS markets. However, several factors (institutional voids related to Russia) played a crucial role in deciding not to pursue this route. One, from her experience the owner had learned that Russian partners are unreliable, not trustworthy, and unwilling to cooperate on payment and delivery terms, sometimes even refusing to pay. And two, trading relationships between the two countries were quite politicized, exposing the Moldovan companies to a high political risk.
Going west was the opposite case; targeting a stable (politically and economically) EU market with potential trustworthy business partners, the owner was aware of the fact that she would in turn have to earn the trust of the EU partners, and at the same time prove and 13 maintain the quality of the products. In those days especially, "Made in Moldova" was not evoking a lot of trust. To mitigate this legitimation challenge, the owner was exploring sales routes via indirect exporting; while aware that the company would lose quite substantially on pricing, that was the price the owner was willing to pay to earn the trust of the key players in the market and to keep the company going.
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The first international market Dried-Fruit entered was the Czech Republic through a buyer the owner knew from her previous experience as an executive director. At the same time Dried-Fruit entered the nearby markets of Romania and Ukraine. The Czech partner later introduced Dried-Fruit to a large buyer in Austria, while the Romanian partner introduced Dried-Fruit to another large buyer in Germany. As the company was growing, Dried-Fruit was also approached by a large buyer from Lithuania.
In addition to the above, the process of internationalization was facilitated by several other factors that relate to the institutional environment. To expand into the EU market, Based on this Policy initiative, the EU-Moldova Action Plan was adopted in 2005, and in 2006, inter alia, Moldova benefitted from the new EU generalized system of preferences (GSP+) 10 that made duty-free (zero tariff) access to the EU market possible for 6,400 products covered by GSP+ (European Commission, 2008) . In addition, the EU introduced autonomous trade preferences to Moldova by removing all remaining tariff ceilings for industrial products and by improving access to the EU market for agricultural products (European Council, 2008) .
Theoretical reflections
Emergence of an economy and a new sector of the economy Extrapolating from the above findings, the new, emerging industry lacks cognitive legitimacy, defined as knowledge about a new activity and what is needed to succeed (Ranger-Moore, Banaszak-Holl, Hannan, 1991) . In such circumstances, a new venture ought to conform to the existing rules, norms and practices of an emerging industry even though their legitimacy, credibility and value are questioned by the incumbent entrepreneurs. As argued by Glynn and Marquis (2004) , new venture conformity to norms and practices will legitimate only to the extent that those norms and practices are themselves legitimate, credible, and valued. From the above it may thus be postulated that:
P1. During the introductory stage of an industry, an emerging venture will focus on educating its key stakeholders about the new activity and its critical success factors, aiming to create cognitive legitimacy.
It is further conjectured from the findings that establishment of cognitive legitimacy is time dependent. That is, cognitive legitimacy is gradually being established as major stakeholders progressively learn and acquire the necessary understanding about the emerging new venture and the sector, though sometimes to the detriment of the new venture(s). Two types of cognitive legitimacy come into fore in the early stages of the new industry emergence. One type will be framed at/by the meso-level and will reflect the understanding of given norms and values. Another type will be framed at/by the micro-level and will reflect the understanding of desired norms and values. The velocity of this convergence will depend primarily on the way entrepreneurs theorize (see e.g., Delmestri and Wezel, 2011; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007) As time elapses, it is further posited that cognitive legitimacy leads to socio-political legitimacy that is defined as the value placed on an activity by cultural norms and political authorities, given existing norms and laws (Ranger-Moore, Banaszak-Holl and Hannan, 1991) . In turn, the establishment of the socio-political legitimacy could be linked to the legitimacy threshold. That is, it can be argued that once a new venture is valued by cultural norms and political authorities, it has reached the legitimacy threshold. Following from this:
P4. The establishment of socio-political legitimacy will be positively associated with the velocity of the convergence of meso and micro cognitive legitimacies.
P5. The acquisition of legitimacy threshold will be positively associated with the establishment of socio-political legitimacy.
It is further suggested to view the lack of cognitive legitimacy in an emerging industry as an institutional void. We side with Khanna, Paleru and Sinha (2005) who argue that before companies conduct the analysis of an industry structure they first should understand a country"s institutional context. However, in light of the above theorizing it can be argued that Khanna, Paleru and Sinha"s framework may capture only the meso-cognitive legitimacy, leaving the micro-cognitive legitimacy out (clearly when applied to a new, emerging industry). The institution void framework could be further enhanced by adding the local government institutional void that captures the effect local governments have or might have on the organizational performance. It is thus suggested that:
P6. The institutional voids will have a negative, moderating effect on the process of internationalization.
Internationalization of new ventures from emerging economies
16
As to the process of internationalization, it can be argued that an emerging new venture is born regional rather international or global, i.e., it is a regional new venture (RNV).
Furthermore, in this process, being affected by various institutional voids locally, an emerging RNV adopts various strategies to gain legitimacy in an emerging sector of an emerging economy and beyond. For example, an emerging RNV will attempt to acquire external legitimacy by partnering with key players in the market. This is in line with the earlier general view that "…network relationships are intangible resources salient to organizational growth" (Coviello, 2005: 723) . It could be further speculated that through such external legitimacy, an RNV will be able to acquire market (better understanding of the international target market) and locational (overcoming liability of foreignness) legitimacies, both being related to the process of acquiring internal legitimacy. It follows that:
P7. The success of internationalization is contingent upon the acquisition of external legitimacy.
P8. The acquisition of external legitimacy leads to the acquisition of market and locational legitimacy.
Furthermore, an RNV will acquire another type of internal legitimacy, i.e., product legitimacy, via certification to demonstrate compliance, for example, with a set of safety and quality requirements, production standards, storage, processing, packaging, and shipping.
Hence:
P9. The success of internationalization is contingent upon the acquisition of internal legitimacy (product legitimacy).
Related to the product legitimacy, backward integration emerged as another legitimation strategy. However, this kind of strategy requires an RNV to acquire additional and considerable expertise in the management of physical resources such as land and water/irrigation, production systems such as crop rotation, varieties, operating costs, technology and husbandry, related human resources, such as family labor, permanent employees, picking labor, related capital items such as debt management and depreciation, and off-farm interests (RMCG, 2004) . In addition to the above, an RNV has to implement best business practices directed towards the protection of the environment, as well as obtain organic certification of the land. All above requirements bring also a higher level of complexity when it comes to building the operating legitimacy of the new venture.
Conclusion
This theory-building study makes an attempt to contribute to international entrepreneurship research field that is fragmented and suffers from theoretical paucity (Jones, Coviello and Tang, 2011) and from a coverage bias (Turcan, Mäkelä, Sørensen and Rönkkö, 2010 ) that focuses mostly on high-tech INVs from developed economies (Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2008) and that needs to borrow more actively from other disciplines in order for IE theory to evolve (Turcan, Mäkelä, Sørensen and Rönkkö, 2010) . In this endeavor, the study, drawing from institutional theory, has explored the process of internationalization of new, familyowned ventures from emerging economies. In line with a theory-building research design, the study adopted a single-case study methodology selecting an information-rich case where the phenomenon was manifested intensely, but not extremely (Miles and Huberman, 1994) .
A set of contributions have been put forward. One set relates to understanding the process of legitimation of an emerging industry. For example, it is conjectured that cognitive legitimacy, as an institutional void, is time-dependent and consists of two types: meso- 
